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SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
On November 20, 1972, the United States Supreme Court pro-
mulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence' pursuant to an enabling act
which provides in pertinent part that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have
the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, writs,
pleadings, and motions, and -the practice and procedure of the dis-
trict courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil ac-
tions .. . and appeals therein . "... 2 The Supreme Court's order
of November 20 provided that the rules would take effect on July
1, 1973, unless sooner acted upon by Congress.3 Chief Justice Bur-
ger transmitted the proposed rules to Congress on February 5, 1973, 4
and they were referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary
through its Subcommittee on Criminal Justice for review and possible
action two days later.'
The new rules were subject to immediate criticism. Justice Doug-
las dissented from the order promulgating the rules, contending that
the Court lacked the statutory authority to make rules of evidence ex-
cept on a case-by-case basis.6 He also criticized the Court's pro forma
1. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rules].
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). This section further provides that "[sluch rules
shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. . . . Such rules shall not
take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the Chief Justice at or after
the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than the first day of May, and
until the expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported." The rules were
also promulgated under other federal statutes. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3771, 3772 (1970)
(criminal practice and appeal, procedure to verdict, procedure after verdict); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2075 (1970) (bankruptcy). Since this note is primarily concerned with the rules as
applied to civil actions, particularly regarding privileges, only section 2072 of title 28
will be considered.
3. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 184. Although the enabling act provides that
the rules shall take effect 90 days after being reported to Congress (28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1970)), the Court has the power to fix a later effective date. Testimony of Judge Al-
bert B. Maris, Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm.
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
Ist Sess., ser. 2, at 12-13, 17-18 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
4. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
HousE REPORT].
5. There the subcommittee opened hearings and began to take testimony on the
desirability of a uniform code of evidence and the merits of each rule. Id. at 4.
6. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 185.
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adoption of the rules which had been prepared by the Advisory Com-
mittee to the Judicial Conference.7 Other authorities argued that there
was no need for the rules,' that the final draft had been prepared in
secrecy,9 and that the power to make rules of evidence was beyond
the authority of the Supreme Court.10 The greatest amount of crit-
icism was leveled against article V of the proposed rules which dealt
with the area of privileges.
Critics of the article V rules complained that the Court had ex-
ceeded the authority of the enabling act by prescribing rules other
than of "practice and procedure" and that the Court had intruded
upon legislative ground, in violation of the separation of powers doc-
trine, by issuing rules which dealt with social policy rather than with
the orderly administration of justice." Further arguments stressed
that the privilege rules violated the mandate of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,'2 which requires state substantive law to be applied in fed-
eral diversity proceedings, by arbitrarily reclassifying state privilege
rules as procedural and thus requiring that federal privilege rules be
used in diversity proceedings.' 3
Because of the serious questions raised concerning the Supreme
Court's capacity to promulgate the rules, in March of 1973, Congress
passed and the president signed Senate Bill 583 which provided that
the rules "shall have no force or effect except to the extent . . . they
may be expressly approved by Act of Congress."' 4 Additionally, Con-
gressman Hungate, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Jus-
tice, which was holding hearings on the proposed rules, and other
members of the subcommittee introducted House Bill 5463 for the pur-
pose of putting the rules before the subcommittee in legislative form.' 5
The House passed the measure after substantial amendment,"" and the
bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.
17
7. Id. at 185-86. For a description of the make-up of the Advisory Committee,
see Hearings, supra note 3, at 79-84.
8. Testimony of Justice Goldberg, Hearings, supra note 3, at 152; Statement of
Judge Friendly, id. at 261-62.
9. Testimony of Judge Mars, id. at 26-27; Statements of Charles R. Halpern &
George T. Frampton, id. at 179-80.
10. See Testimony of Justice Goldberg, Hearings, supra note 3, at 142-46.
11. Id. at 143-44, 147.
12. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
13. Testimony of Justice Goldberg, Hearings, supra note 3, at 143-47. See text
accompanying note 90 infra.
14. Pub. L. No. 93-12 (Mar. 30, 1973).
15. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4. After extensive hearings the subcommittee
significantly modified the bill. The bill was further amended by the full committee and
reported to the House on November 15, 1973. Id. at 1, 4.
16. 120 CONG. RPc. H569-70 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
17. Id. at S1552 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1974).
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FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
On January 2, 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.' An important feature of the congressional enactment is a pro-
vision allowing future Supreme Court amendment of the rules.19 Be-
cause an understanding of the significance and implications of this
procedure necessarily involves an analysis of the constitutionality of
the Supreme Court's rulemaking power, -this note will discuss the
constitutional power of the Court to make rules of procedure for -the
federal courts and will then determine whether evidence rules fit
within such power. This determination will focus primarily upon the
substantive/procedural distinction which the Supreme Court has tra-
ditionally utilized to ascertain the validity of court-made rules.
Under this analysis, the majority of evidence rules clearly are
procedural and within the Court's rulemaking power. The major
controversy concerns privilege rules. Although the House of Repre-
sentatives found privileges to be substantive and beyond the Supreme
Court's promulgating power, Congress failed to adopt the House's res-
olution of this issue.20 Instead, Congress sought to resolve the prob-
lem by retaining the House-recommended amendment process which
would prevent Supreme Court amendments to privilege rules from
taking effect unless enacted by Congress. While this solution tempo-
rarily resolves the constitutional difficulties surrounding Supreme Court
promulgation of arguably substantive rules, it raises additional consti-
tutional questions. A proposal to alleviate this conflict shall therefore
be examined.
The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court
As the final court of review in the federal judiciary, the Supreme
Court possesses supervisory power over the procedure of the inferior
federal courts.2  By logical extension, then, if -the Supreme Court
ever possesses the authority to promulgate rules of judicial practice
and procedure outside the context of a case or controversy, it argu-
ably has the power to do so for the district courts and circuit courts of
appeal.
Article III, section 1 of the United States Constitution provides
that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish." Section 2 of the same article sub-
jects the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to such 'Excep-
tions and... Regulations as the Congress shall make." This legisla-
18. Pub. L. No. 93-595 (Jan. 2, 1975).
19. Id. See text accompanying notes 117-24 infra.
20. CoNFERENcE RE. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., in U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmIN. NEws 88, 97 (Jan. 15, 1975).
21. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943).
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tive control over the Court's appellate jurisdiction has made definition
of the Court's powers difficult: the Constitution ostensibly gives the
judicial power to the Supreme Court, but simultaneously places some
of that power under congressional control.2 2  The problem is to de-
termine to what degree the power to make rules of judicial practice
and procedure is constitutionally a legislative or judicial function.
Historical Perspective
The members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 were
united in their desire for separate and independent branches of gov-
ernment.2 3 Again and again they voiced the concern that one branch
might dominate the other.24  The necessity of an independent judici-
ary was urged in the debates over the judges' mode of appointment, 2
tenure,26 and salary;2 7 yet, as Farrand noted, "To one who is espe-
cially interested in the judiciary, there is surprisingly little on the sub-
ject to be found in the records of the convention. ' 28  Although the
delegates to the convention did debate the jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court,29 the Constitution ultimately said nothing concerning the
Court's power -to regulate its proceedings.
The Federalist Papers also stressed the independence of the courts.
Hamilton felt that the judiciary was the weakest of the three branches
of government and would be unable to attack either of the other
two successfully. Accordingly, he believed that all possible care was
necessary to protect the judiciary from legislative and executive at-
tacks, ° and agreed with Montesquieu that "there is no liberty, if the
power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers."13 ' Hamilton also supported the judges' tenure during good
behavior3 2 and their protected salary,33 believing them to be essential
to the maintenance of judicial independence.
22. While it is true that the exceptions and regulations clause would not prevent
the Supreme Court from making rules concerning the Court's original jurisdiction, the
fact that the bulk of the Court's work is appellate emphasizes the importance of this
restriction.
23. See J. MADISON, NoTEs OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 79-81, 306-9, 311-18, 333-46, 536-37 (Koch ed. 1966).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 314-17, 343-46.
26. Id. at 536-37.
27. Id. at 317-18.
28. M. FARAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTTrUTON 154-55 (1913).
29. J. MADISON, NoTEs OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
538-40 (Koch ed. 1966).
30. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 99 (E. Bourne ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton).
31. Id. at 100, quoting in part 1 C. MONTEsQUiEU, THE SP=RT OF LAws 182 (Al-
dine ed. 1900).
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (E. Bourne ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton).
33. Id. No. 79.
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Unlike the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, Hamilton
was not completely silent concerning the rulemaking power. In an-
swer to criticism that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over
law and fact would destroy the right to a jury trial, Hamilton stated
that Congress's power to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court also included the power, if necessary, to require jury trials
upon appeal or to abolish the Court's jurisdiction as to fact.34 There is,
however, no other indication in the Federalist Papers of Hamilton's view
toward the rulemaking power.
The justices of -the first Supreme Court were not, however, with-
out guidance concerning their mode of proceedings. Prior to the adop-
tion of the Constitution the common law of England provided the con-
cept of judicial power in America.35 At the time the federal Constitu-
tion was being adopted, the power to make general rules governing
procedure in England was in the King's Courts at Westminster, as it
had been for centuries.36 Ordinarily, causes at bar were tried in cir-
cuit courts, while the King's Courts regulated the procedure of the
circuit. Similarly, although the courts of assize and nisi prius were in-
dependent courts, the practice in both was governed by general rules
made by the Westminster courts which 'had authority to review their
proceedings. 3 7 "Thus judicial power, under the system which we in-
herited, included the regulation of procedure [in trial courts] by rules
of the superior courts of England."
38
Judicial Nature of the Rulemaking Process
The judicial nature of the rulemaking process has been consist-
ently recognized. In 1789 the First Congress passed the Judiciary Act
which gave the federal courts the power "to make and establish all
necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the said courts,
provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United
States. 39  The federal courts never utilized this rulemaking power in
34. Id. No. 81, at 127-29.
35. People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 14, 192 N.E. 634, 636 (1934); see Pound, Reg-
ulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court, 10 ILL. L. REv. 163, 171-73, (1915).
36. Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599, 601 (1926).
37. id. The courts of assize were courts consisting of a certain number of men,
usually 12, summoned together to try a disputed case. These men performed the func-
tions of a jury except that they gave a verdict based on their own investigation and
knowledge. BLAcn's LAv DIcrxoARY 154 (4th rev. ed. 1968). The nisi prius courts
were those held for the trial of issues of fact before a jury and one presiding judge, as
distinguished from an appellate court. Id. at 1197.
38. People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 14, 192 N.E. 634, 636 (1934); see Pound, Reg-
ulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court, 10 ILL. L. Rav. 163, 171-73 (1915).
39. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 83. Five days after this act be-
came effective, however, Congress enacted another statute which stipulated that in ac-
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actions at law, however, and the statutory empowerment was repealed
by the Conformity Act of 1872.40
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the rulemaking power as
a judicial function in several opinions. 41  The issue usually arises
when a litigant claims that Congress has improperly delegated legisla-
tive power by granting to the judicary the power to make procedural
rules. The Supreme Court typically responds, as it did in Wayman v.
Southard,42 that "[e]very court has, like every other public political
body, the power necessary and proper to provide for the orderly con-
duct of its business.
Yet, while the Supreme Court has always considered the rule-
making process to be judicial in nature, it has nevertheless consist-
ently recognized the preeminence of the legislative branch in this
area. For example, in the Wayman case the Court declared:
Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the leg-
islature may rightfully exercise itself . . . . The Courts, for exam-
ple, may make rules, directing -the returning of writs and processes,
the filing of declarations and other pleadings, and other things of the
same description. It will not be contended, that these things might
not be done by the legislature, without the intervention of the courts;
yet it is not alleged -that the power may not be conferred on the ju-
dicial department. 44
Similarly, in Bank of the United States v. Halstead45 the Court noted
that "Congress might regulate the whole practice of the Courts, if it
was deemed expedient so to do; but this power is vested in the Courts;
tions at law procedure in the federal courts should be the same in each state "as are
now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same." Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch.
21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93. This conformity to state procedure in actions at law was reaffirmed
in 1792 by a permanent statute. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 276. This
act made no provision for states admitted to the union after September 29, 1789 (the
federal procedure had to conform to state procedure as of that date), and in those states
the federal court was free to choose its procedure. The Supreme Court refused to utilize
its rulemaking power for actions at law, though, feeling that its duty was "to yield rather
than encroach" upon state practice. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL
COURTS 256 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
40. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197. This section provided that
the "practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceedings in other than equity and
admiralty causes in the circuit and district courts of the United States shall conform,
as near as may be, to [the practices of the state courts]." Id.
41. In 1792, the attorney general sought information concerning the rules and
practices of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Jay replied that the Court would follow
the practices of the English courts of King's Bench and Chancery, making modifications
when necessary. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 414 (1792).
42. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
43. Id. at 15; accord, State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 420, 60 P.2d 646, 660 (1936).
44. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43.
45. Id. at 51.
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and it never has occurred to anyone that it was a delegation of legisla-
tive power.1
40
This legislative primacy results from Congress's power to make
"Exceptions and . . . Regulations" to the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction. 47  Justice Chase acknowledged this legislative control in
Turner v. Bank of North America48 when he noted:
[Tihe disposal of the judicial power (except in a few specified in-
stances) belongs to congress. If congress has given the power to
this court, we possess it, not otherwise: and if congress has not given
the power to us, or to any other court, it still remains at the legisla-
tive disposal.
49
Recognition of congressional control over the Court's appellate
jurisdiction was dramatically displayed in Ex part McCardle.50 Mc-
Cardle appealed a circuit court denial of a writ of habeas corpus to
the Supreme Court, alleging that the Court had jurisdiction under a
statute passed in 1867. While his appeal was before the Supreme
Court in 1868, Congress repealed the act giving the court jurisdiction.
Despite the fact that all arguments had been heard, the Court dis-
missed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.51
Legislative control over the judicial process is not, however, abso-
lute. Congress has no power to make rules of decision for cases pend-
ing in court. In United States v. Klein52 the Supreme Court faced a sit-
uation similar to that of the McCardle case. Congress sought to
change the legal effect of a presidential pardon by providing that such
pardons could not be considered as proof of loyalty in the courts and
that acceptance of a pardon without a disclaimer of rebellious acts
would be proof of disloyalty.53  The Supreme Court understood the
significance of the congressional action: the act would punish those
who had been pardoned rather than absolve them of guilt and would
46. Id. at 61.
47. U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
48. 4 U.S. (4Dall.) 8 (1799).
49. Id. at 10 n.(a); accord, Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307,
314 (1810).
50. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
51. Id. at 515.
52. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
53. President Lincoln had issued pardons to those rebels who had sworn allegiance
to the United States. The president's proclamation stipulated that the granting of a par-
don would restore all property rights, except as to slaves, to the recipient. Klein sought
to recover the proceeds from confiscated cotton pursuant to the terms of the pardon.
The Court of Claims upheld Klein's action saying that the pardon negated any rebel-
lious acts which, under the confiscation statute, would have prevented him from recover-
ing the property. Congress, however, enacted legislation stipulating that pardons would
not be construed as evidence of loyalty in the Court of Claims or appellate courts. It
was further provided that a pardon accepted without a disclaimer of rebellious acts would
be considered proof of disloyalty. Id. at 130-34.
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prohibit the restoration of property for which the pardon had provided.
Furthermore, as the Court observed, "[tihe court is forbidden [by
the act] to give the effect to evidence which, in its own judgment, such
evidence should have, and is directed to give it an effect precisely con-
trary." 54  The Court asserted that application of the act would be in
violation of the Constitution because Congress was attempting to exer-
cise judicial power. 55
Klein illustrates that the principle of separation of power prohibits
the legislature not only from exercising judicial functions but also from
unduly burdening or interfering with the judicial department in its ex-
ercise of those functions.56 Thus, although in McCardle Congress
possessed the power to withdraw the jurisdiction which it had granted,
the Court in Klein could not permit Congress to make rules of deci-
sion because that was "not an exercise of the acknowledged power
of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the ap-
pellate power.'
5 7
In addition to legislative primacy in this area, a further limitation
exists upon the Supreme Court's rulemaking power. The Court cannot
promulgate rules which are substantive in nature, because to do so
would violate the cases and controversies clause of the United States
Constitution.58 This provision prohibits the Supreme Court from mak-
ing substantive law except in the context of a concrete case or contro-
versy.59 If the Court did otherwise it would be invading the legislative
54. Id. at 147.
55. Id.
56. See H. RoTrSCHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 52
(1939); Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157, 201 (1960). "mhe exceptions must not be such as
will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan." Hart,
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Di-
alectic, 66 HARv. L. RaV. 1362, 1365 (1953).
57. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
58. Article III, section two of the Constitution provides that "Itihe judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States . . . Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party;
-to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of an-
other State;--between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."
59. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.
346 (1911).
In Flast v. Cohen, the Court said that "[e]mbodied in the words 'cases' and 'con-
troversies' are two complementary but somewhat different limitations. In part those
words limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context
and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process.
And in part those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation
[Vol. 26
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province reserved to Congress under article I, section 1 of the Consti-
tution.60 Congress acknowledged this constitutional limitation upon
the Supreme Court's rulemaking power when it passed the enabling
act. The act provides that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right. ... 61
If the Constitution were merely silent regarding the power to
promulgate rules of judicial procedure, it could hardly be doubted that
the Supreme Court possessed the rulemaking power as part of the ju-
dicial power granted by the Constitution. However, the Constitu-
tion has given Congress the prerogative of making exceptions and
regulations to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. It is appar-
ent from the preceding discussion that the constitutional power to make
rules of court procedure is neither exclusively legislative nor entirely ju-
dicial.6 The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules within
limits imposed by Congress although Congress cannot impede the func-
tioning of the Court.
Constitutionality of the Proposed Rules
Under the enabling act Congress removed the barriers to Supreme
Court promulgation of procedural rules, but the Court is constitution-
ally and statutorily prevented from issuing substantive rules. There-
fore, in order to determine whether the proposed Federal Rules of Ev-
idence were within the Court's constitutional power it was necessary
to establish whether they were "substantive"' or "procedural." Since
the rules would have been used in federal diversity cases the "sub-
stantive" test for determining whether a rule is within the constitu-
tional limitations of the enabling act should be distinguished from the
test used to determine "substance" under the Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins63 doctrine.
of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the
other branches of government." 392 U.S. at 94-95.
60. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
62. H. RorrSCHA R, HANDBOOK OF AmpmcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 52 (1939);
see State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 418-19, 60 P.2d 646, 659 (1936); Foster-Wyman Lumber
Co. v. Superior Ct., 148 Wash. 1, 5, 267 P. 770, 773 (1928); In re Constitutionality
of Section 251.18, Wis. Stat., 204 Wis. 501, 510, 236 N.W. 717, 720-21 (1931). Wig-
more felt that the rulemaking power belongs exclusively to the courts. Wigmore, All
Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REv. 276
(1928). Compare Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Mak-
ing: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARv. L. REv. 234 (1951), with
Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARv. L. Rv. 28 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Procedure in New Jersey]. For an excellent presentation of the
policy considerations against absolute judicial rulemaking power, see Levin & Amster-
dam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making, 107 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1 (1958).
63. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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The Erie Test
In Erie the Supreme Court sought to put an end to the forum shop-
ping and inequitable administration of the law which had ensued since
the 1824 decision of Swift v. Tyson.64 The Court had held in Tyson
that in diversity cases the Rules of Decision Act65 only required the
federal courts to apply state statutory law and that the courts could
use federal common law where the state legislatures had not spo-
ken.66 Thus, since the state court would apply state decisional law
while the federal court would use federal common law, entirely differ-
ent results were possible in an action between citizens of different
states depending upon the choice of forum. The result of the differ-
ences in substantive law was forum shopping to an unprecedented de-
gree." The Supreme Court responded to this situation in the Erie deci-
sion, declaring that state substantive law was to be applied in diver-
sity cases and that it made no difference whether the state law was de-
clared in a statute or by the state's highest court in a decision.
68
Less than five months after the Erie decision, however, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure became effective.69 Inevitably the rules con-
flicted with -the Erie doctrine, for while Erie sought conformity to
state substantive law in diversity actions, the federal rules were in-
tended to promote the uniformity of federal procedure in all civil ac-
tions. This conflict was intensified after the decision in Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York7" which provided a new test for establishing whether a
rule was substantive or procedural under Erie. The Supreme Court
stated that a rule which would significantly affect the outcome of the
case if it had been brought in state court was outcome determinative
and had to be applied in federal court.
71
The Hanna Test
Eventually the Erie doctrine had to collide head-on with one of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such a collision occurred in the
case of Hanna v. Plumer 2 where there was a direct clash between a
64. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
65. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92.
66. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18-19.
67. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-77 (1938). Probably the
most criticized result of the Swift v. Tyson doctrine was the 1928 decision in Black &
White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
68. 304 U.S. at 78. For a complete discussion of the Erie doctrine, see WIGHT,
supra note 39, at 219-53.
69. The date was September 16, 1938. WRiGHT, supra note 39, at 259. Erie was
decided on April 25, 1938.
70. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
71. Id. at 108-10.
72. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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state rule and Rule 4(d)(1). The federal rule authorized substituted
service on an executor by leaving the process at his usual place of
abode whereas the state rule required in-hand service within a speci-
fied period. Under the facts of the case, if the state rule were ap-
plied the plaintiff's action would have been barred. The Supreme
Court responded by disregarding the outcome determinative test and
saying that Erie was not the proper test when the question was gov-
erned by one of the Rules of Civil Procedure. If the rule were valid
under the enabling act and the Constitution, it was to be applied re-
gardless of contrary state law.
73
The Supreme Court had made its only attempt at defining the
term "procedure" under the enabling act in Sibbach v. Wilson &
Co. 74  In that case the Court stated that to differentiate between sub-
stance and procedure the test "must be whether a rule really regulates
procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recog-
nized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and re-
dress for disregard or infraction of them."75
While recognizing the validity of the Sibbach test the Supreme
Court significantly modified it in Hanna. The Court noted that nei-
ther Congress nor the federal courts could make rules which were not
supported by a grant of federal authority in the Constitution. In such
areas state law had to govern because there was no other law.76 But
the Court added:
[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented
by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional
power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those
courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which,
though falling within the uncertain area between substance and pro-
cedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.77
In other words, if a rule can rationally be classified as procedural un-
der the Sibbach test there is no constitutional conflict with its promul-
gation and application. The Court in Hanna found Rule 4(d)(1) to
be procedural under this test despite any substantive effects caused
by application of the rule.
Evidence Rules and the Substantive Test
Able writers have asserted that the majority of evidence rules fall
within "procedure" as enunciated in Sibbach since they are involved
73. Id. at 471.
74. 312 U.S. 1 (1941); Comment, Evidentiary Privileges in the Federal Courts,
52 CALw. L. REv. 640, 643 (1964).
75. 312 U.S. at 14.
76. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965).
77. Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
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only with the orderly dispatch of judicial business. 7  Evidence rules
may be divided into three categories: truth determining rules, rules
closely associated with particular substantive rights, and those state
evidence rules which protect extrinsic policy.79 The majority of the
rules belong to the first category and no problem exists with their
promulgation because they are clearly procedural. s0 "Rules concern-
ing privileges, presumptions and burdens of proof involve more and
should be classified as substantive" 8' and thus beyond the Supreme
Court's rulemaking power.
Privileges
The proposed federal rules would have made substantial changes
in the present law of privileges. No privileges other than those "re-
quired by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act
of Congress" would have been recognized except for those provided by
the proposed rules themselves or by other rules adopted by the Supreme
Court. 2  Although the proposed rules recognized lawyer-client,"3
psychotherapist-patient, 4 and clergyman-penitent85 privileges, they did
not adopt any doctor-patient or newsman-source privileges. Similarly,
while providing a husband-wife privilege86 in criminal proceedings the
rules made no provision for such a privilege in civil suits. Also, de-
spite the fact that the majority of states recognize doctor-patient 87 and
husband-wife88 privileges, and a large number of states provide a
newsman-source privilege, 9 the rules would have specifically provided
that these privileges not be observed in diversity proceedings.90
78. See notes 80-81 infra.
79. Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. Rlv. 353, 361-73 (1969).
80. Green, Preliminary Study of the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing
Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 30 F.R.D. 79, 101-8, 114-15 (1962);
Joiner, Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D. 429, 435 (1957);
Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making,
55 MIcK. L. REv. 623, 651 (1957).
81. Joiner, Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D. 429, 435
(1957); Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule
Making, 55 MICH. L. RPv. 623, 651 (1957); see Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity
Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 353, 363-
73 (1969). Contra, Green, Highlights of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 4
GA. L. REv. 1, 10 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Highlights of Proposed Rules].
82. Proposed Rules, supra note 1, Rule 501, at 230.
83. Id. Rule 503, at 235.
84. Id. Rule 504, at 240.
85. Id. Rule 506, at 247.
86. Id. Rule 505, at 244.
87. C. McCoRMIcK, EViDENCE § 98, at 212-13 (2d ed. 1972).
88. Id. § 78, at 162.
89. Statement of Jack C. Landau, Hearings, supra note 3, at 380, 382 (19 states).
90. Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 501, Proposed Rules, supra note 1, at 232-
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Much criticism was leveled at the manner in which article V of
the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence dealt with the various privi-
leges. The American Medical Association protested the omission of a
doctor-patient privilege,91 psychotherapists objected that the proposed
psychotherapist privilege was not broad enough,0 2 and reporters criti-
cized the lack of a newsman-source privilege.93 More generally, critics
insisted that there was no need for any uniform rules of evidence
because the present system works effectively and evidence does not
lend itself to codification,94 and that adoption of such rules would
only encourage the forum shopping which the Erie decision promised
to eliminate.9 5
Proponents of the rules, on the other hand, stressed that consti-
tutional privileges, such as the privilege against self-incrimination,
were not threatened by the rules.96 They asserted that state privileges
afford only partial protection anyway because they cannot be used
to exclude evidence in a federal criminal proceeding, in a federal
question case, or in bankruptcy.9 7  Additionally, the proponents con-
tended that privileges are ineffectual in supporting the social policies
sought to be encouraged by the state legislatures since most people are
unaware of their existence.98  Finally, the advocates of the rules pro-
tested that some privileges, particularly those pertaining to the doc-
tor-patient and husband-wife relationships, only serve to prevent
the discovery of the truth.9
Yet, in the final analysis, the question of whether or not the pro-
posed privilege rules were correctly drafted was beside the point since
the important issue was whether the Court, rather than Congress, had
the power to issue such rules in the first place. Under -the enabling
act the Supreme Court's power to promulgate any rule exists only if such
a rule is procedural rather than substantive. Under the Sibbach v.
Wilson test 00 of whether the rule really regulates procedure, privilege
rules would be substantive. Former Justice Goldberg has noted that
91. Statement of the American Medical Association, Hearings, supra note 3, at
192-94.
92. Statement by Patricia Wald, id. at 465.
93. Statement of Jack C. Landau, id. at 380.
94. Testimony of Justice Goldberg, id. at 152; Statement of Judge Friendly, id. at
261-62.
95. Statement of Judge Friendly, id. at 261, 263.
96. Highlights of Proposed Rules, supra note 81, at 8.
97. Id. at 10; Reply Statement of Edward W. Cleary, Hearings, supra note 3, at
546, 551-54.
98. Highlights of Proposed Rules, supra note 81, at 11-12, 15. For a discussion
of the policies underlying various privilege rules, see text accompanying notes 103-4
infra.
99. Highlights of Proposed Rules, supra note 81, at 12.
100. See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
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"what we are dealing with are not the ordinary evidentiary rules fol-
lowed in a courtroom in pursuit of truth. The privileges which are
involved . . . are designed to protect interpersonal relations which
may never reach a courtroom."''
Privilege rules are not intended to regulate court procedure but
rather to promote state social policy. In creating a privilege, society,
working through the state legislatures, has decided that protecting a
given relationship is more important than reaching the truth in a law-
suit. 10 2  The doctor-patient privilege, for example, is intended to pro-
mote confidential communications betweeen persons in the relation-
ship of patient and physician by protecting such communications
from compulsory revelation. 03 Similarly, the husband-wife privilege
reflects a legislative determination that the sanctity of the marriage
relationship requires the confidentiality of marital communications. 10 4
A large number of federal courts which have dealt with the priv-
ilege problem have decided that privileges are substantive.' 0 5 While
these cases have been concerned with Erie questions, the criteria
which the courts have utilized have been whether the privileges rep-
resent expressions of state social policy. In Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Brei'016 the Second Circuit noted that the patient-
physician privilege was more than a rule of procedure since it ap-
plied to a relationship established and maintained outside the area
of litigation and affeoted people's private conduct. In Krizak v. W.C.
Brooks & Sons, Inc. 0 7 the Fouth Circuit upheld the application of
Virginia's privilege against the use of state accident reports in subse-
quent liability proceedings, observing that "a serious problem of inter-
ference with state policy might arise if the federal government were
101. Testimony of Justice Goldberg, Hearings, supra note 3, at 144. The Califor-
nia Law Revision Commission has noted: "If confidentiality is to be protected effec-
tively by a privilege, the privilege must be recognized in proceedings other than ju-
dicial proceedings. [Otherwise] [elvery officer with power to issue subpoenas for in-
vestigative purposes, every administrative agency, every local governing board, and many
more persons could pry into the protected information .... ." CAL. Evm. CODE § 910,
Law Revision Comm'n Comment (West 1966). Section 910 makes privileges applicable
in all proceedings unless otherwise provided by statute.
102. Statement of Alan B. Morrison, Hearings, supra note 3, at 436, 441; CAL.
Eve. CODE § 910, Law Revision Comm'n Comment (West 1966).
103. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463, 466 (2d Cir. 1962).
104. CAL. Evm. CODE § 970, Law Revision Comm'n Comment (West 1966).
105. E.g., Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 555-56 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1967); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463, 466 (2d Cir. 1962);
Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956);
Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (N.D. Miss. 1970); see Krizak v. W.C. Brooks
& Sons, Inc., 320 F.2d 37, 43 (4th Cir. 1963); Baird v. Koemer, 279 F.2d 623, 632
(9th Cir. 1960).
106. 311 F.2d 463, 466 (2d Cir. 1962).
107. 320 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1963).
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to completely ignore state created confidential relationships. '08
Those who favor court-made privilege rules argue that privileges
are rationally capable of classification as either substantive or proce-
dural and are thus within the Supreme Court's rulemaking power un-
der the Hanna v. Plumer reasoning. 10 9 Insofar as privileges represent
social policy decisions to protect interpersonal relationships, it is hard
to understand how they may rationally be classified as procedural.
The Second Circuit, subsequent to Hanna, noted in dictum that
[rlules of privilege are not mere "housekeeping" rules which are "ra-
tionally capable of classification as either" substantive or procedural
... . Such rules "affect people's conduct at ,the stage of primary
private activity and should therefore be classified as substantive or
quasi-substantive."" 0
Significantly, the states which have adopted modern evidence
codes have recognized that privilege rules should be made by the leg-
islature."' For example, the California legislature adopted the state
Evidence Code and deliberately framed it to permit court expansion
of the rules for admissibility of evidence except in the area of privi-
leges, where further development was precluded except by legisla-
tion.112  In New Jersey the state supreme court possesses the exclusive
constitutional power to promulgate procedural rules of court, yet when
the evidence code was adopted the state legislature enacted the privi-
lege rules.1 3 Finally, although the House of Representatives found
the privilege rules to be substantive and thus beyond the rulemaking
power of the Supreme Court," 4 Congress has apparently chosen not to
resolve this issue.'1
108. Id. at 43.
109. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
110. Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 555 n.2 (2d Cir.
1967).
111. The three states which have adopted evidence codes are California, Kansas,
and New Jersey, see Highlights of Proposed Rules, supra note 81, at 23. In both Cali-
fornia, CAL. EvD. CODE (West 1966), and Kansas, KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-401
to -460 (1964), the codes were adopted through legislation; in New Jersey the rules were
a combination of legislative and judicial action.
112. CALiFORN I.W REvISION CoMnIssIoN, RECOMMENDATION PROPOSING AN
EVIDENCE CODE 34 (1965).
113. N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2A:84A-1 to -49 (Supp. 1974-75). The New Jersey Con-
stitution of 1947 provided in article VI, section II, paragraph 3, that "Ithe Supreme
Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, sub-
ject to law,. the practice and procedure in all such courts." The New Jersey Supreme
Court interpreted the phrase "subject to law" to mean that the Supreme Court could not
make substantive rules, but that for all procedural rules the Supreme Court possessed
the exclusive rulemaking power. Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950). Compare Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Rela-
tion to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARv. L. Rnv.
234 (1951), with Procedure in New Jersey, supra note 62, at 28.
114. HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8-9.
115. See S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN.
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Congressional Response to the Rules
The power of Congress to disapprove court-made rules under the
enabling act has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court and by the
proponents of the rules. 16 After extensive hearings on the proposed
federal rules the House Judiciary Committee decided that evidence
rules were not within the scope of the enabling act which authorizes
the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of "practice and procedure"
because they are to a large degree substantive in their nature or im-
pact." 7  The committee did not, however, feel that such rules were
beyond the constitutional power of the Supreme Court; in House Bill
5463,8 the legislative version of the rules, the committee provided
a procedure for Supreme Court amendment of the evidence rules. The
new legislation gave Congress the power to veto the Court's amend-
ments since they would take effect unless disapproved by resolution of
either the House of Representatives or the Senate within 180 days of
being reported by the chief justice. 19
The House of Representatives completely altered the proposed
privilege rules. Instead of spelling out the various privileges, the
House adopted a general rule that privileges "shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts
of the United States in the light of reason and experience."' 20 In di-
versity proceedings, however, state privileges would apply because the
Judiciary Committee reasoned that "in civil cases in the federal courts
where an element of a claim or defense is not grounded upon a federal
question, there is no federal interest strong enough to justify departure
from State policy."' 21  Additionally, on the floor of the House an
amendment was added to House Bill 5463 that any Supreme Court
amendment "creating, abolishing, or modifying a privilege shall have
no force or effect unless it shall be approved by act of Congress
.... 122 The primary reason for this amendment was the fear that
allowing the Supreme Court to promulgate substantive rules, subject
NEws 41, 60 (Jan. 15, 1975); CONFERENCE REP. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., in
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 88, 97 (Jan. 15, 1975).
116. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1941); Statement of Judge Albert
B. Mars, Hearings, supra note 3, at 73, 77. As Chief Justice Burger noted, "[Rulemak-
ing] is a joint enterprise, and while Congress has rendered us the compliment of general
approval in the past, it does not mean that the Congress should accept blindly or on
faith whatever we submit." Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary-Supplement, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2, at 8-9 (1973).
117. HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
118. H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1973) (Proposed § 2076).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 79 (Proposed Rule 501).
121. House REPORT, supra note 4, at 9.
122. 120 CONG. REc. H567 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
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only to congressional veto, was unconstitutional since the Supreme
Court in effect would be legislating rules on substantive matters in
violation of the cases and controversies clause.' 23 All the preceding
recommendations of the House Judiciary Committee were retained in
the final version of the bill enacted by Congress on January 2, 1975.11
Congress has recognized the problem, inherent in a system
of court-made evidence rules, of insuring that the Supreme Court
does not overstep constitutional limitations and attempt to exercise leg-
islative functions. Although the Court possessed the capacity under
the enabling act to promulgate the majority of evidence rules Con-
gress decided to resolve all controversy by enacting a new section spe-
cifically dealing with evidence rules. The new addition -to title 28 of
the United States Code also reinforces congressional control over the
rulemaking process since rules proposed by the Supreme Court could
be vetoed by resolution of either house of Congress rather than by
the joint resolution necessary under the present system.' 25
The main problem with the Congressional response to the pro-
posed evidence rules is the procedure it has established for amending
privilege rules. Failing to decide that privilege rules were substantive
and outside -the Supreme Court's rulemaking power, Congress sought
instead to resolve this issue by preventing Court amendments to such
rules from taking effect unless approved by act of Congress. Such a
procedure raises serious questions of constitutionality because the Su-
preme Court would, in essence, be making advisory opinions.
Advisory Opinions
Article EI1 of the United States Constitution vests the judicial power
in the Supreme Court and such inferior federal courts as Congress
may establish. One of the limitations placed upon such courts is that
they cannot exercise this power except in the context of a case or con-
roversy. The Supreme Court has concluded that the case or contro-
versy clause prohibits it from giving advice to the legislative or exec-
utive branch because the Court would be performing an extra-judicial
function in violation of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has consistently refrained from giving such
advisory opinions. In 1793, for example, President Washington
sought the advice of the Supreme Court regarding the rights and du-
ties of a neutral country. 26 Although the answers to the president's
123. Id. at H567-68.
124. Pub. L. No. 93-595 (Jan. 2, 1975). Congress, however, avoided resolving the
question of whether privilege rules are substantive. See note 115 & accompanying text
supra.
125. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
126. H. HART & H. WSCHLER, Tim FEDEmA CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
64 (2d ed. 1973).
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questions were needed, the Court refused to provide the advice. The
justices relied upon the Constitution's separation of powers doctrine,
asserting that the three branches "being in certain respects checks
upon each other, and our being judges of a court in the last resort,
are considerations which -afford strong arguments against the propri-
ety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions alluded to. .... 1.,2
In Flast v. Cohen 28 the Supreme Court responded to the argu-
ment that the ban on advisory opinions was based solely on historical
precedent by stating that "the implicit policies embodied in Article III,
and not history alone, impose the rule against advisory opinions on
the federal courts.' 29  The Court found that the rule against advis-
ory opinions implemented the separation of powers prescribed by the
Constitution by keeping the federal courts within their constitutionally
assigned role as expositors of the law in the context of a case or
controversy.
130
Probably the example most closely analogous to the proposed
amendment process would be that of the Court of Claims' jurisdic-
tion over congressional referrals, a jurisdiction which the court has ex-
ercised throughout its existence. "Referrals" were private bills intro-
duced in Congress on behalf of parties otherwise without remedy for
harm inflicted by the United States. Congress referred these bills to
the Court of Claims for consideration. The court heard arguments,
made detailed findings of fact, and rendered an opinion on the mer-
its. However, unless the claim was one over which the court would
have had jurisdiction in the absence of referral, -the decision was not
binding upon the United States, and Congress could grant or refuse re-
lief at its discretion.
13
In 1962 the Supreme Court confirmed the status of the Court of
Claims as an article II constitutional court rather than an article I,
section 8 legislative court. 32  As a constitutional court the Court of
Claims came under the case and controversy clause and the ban
against advisory opinions. Upon achieving its new status the Court of
Claims refused to take jurisdiction over congressional referrals; to do
so would constitute the giving of advisory opinions since the court's
resolution of the case would not be binding on Congress.' 33 The
127. Id. at 65.
128. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
129. Id. at 96.
130. Id. at 97.
131. Comment, The Court of Claims and Congressional Referrals, 51 VA. L. REV.
486, 486-87 (1965).
132. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 582-84 (1962).
133. Comment, The Court of Claims and Congressional Referrals, 51 VA. L. REv.
486, 487, 493 (1965). The Supreme Court in Glidden had expressed doubts concerning
the capacity of the Court of Claims to take jurisdiction over such referrals as an article
III court. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 582 (1962).
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problem was finally resolved by legislation which authorized referrals
to the commissioners of the Court of Claims rather than to the judges." 4
The commissioners then handled the fact-finding process and gave the
opinions which the judges had done in the past. In this manner the
constitutional problems were avoided.
13 5
Congress has attempted to avoid the constitutional problems in-
herent in Supreme Court promulgation of arguably substantive rules
through its procedure for Court amendment of privilege rules. The
machinery which it has provided for the amendment of privilege rules
is, however, inadequate for the task. If the Supreme Court were to
propose amendments to the privilege rules, it would violate the Consti-
tution by submitting rules it has no power to promulgate, or, in effect,
making advisory opinions. Congress may, of course, legislate priv-
ilege rules on its own, but, in that event, the legislature would be de-
priving itself of the judicial input which it sought to promote through
the enabling acts.
There is a solution to this constitutional dilemma. The Supreme
Court should continue to promulgate, or amend, the majority of the
evidence rules to provide the judicial expertise and flexibility which
court-made rules have to offer. 36 On the other hand, in order to
avoid exceeding its jurisdiction under the Constitution, -the Court
should neither make nor recommend rules of privilege. Congress,
however, may still receive the judicial input it desires by seeking rec-
ommendations directly from the Judicial Conference. Such a proce-
dure would not only ensure congressional access to judicial expertise
but would also avoid the advisory opinion problems inherent with Su-
preme Court recommendations concerning matters of substantive law.
The Judicial Conference
The Judicial Conference of the United States originated in 1922 as
the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges in response to the increasing
backlog of pending cases in the federal courts. 3 7  The conference
was an annual meeting of the chief justice of the Supreme Court and
the senior circuit judges of the circuit courts of appeal. The purpose
of the conference was to make a comprehensive survey of the condi-
134. Act of October 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-681, §§ 1-2, 80 Stat. 958-59, amend-
ing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (1970).
135. Jacoby, Recent Legislation Affecting the Court of Claims, 55 GEo. L.J. 397,
414-21 (1966).
136. For a discussion of the advantages of judicial rulemaking, see Green, Prelimi-
nary Study of the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence
for the Federal Courts, 30 F.R.D. 79 (1962); Procedure in New Jersey, supra note 62,
at 28; Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926).
137. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 838. For a complete history of
the origin and development of the Judicial Conference, see Chandler, Some Major Ad-
vances in the Federal Judicial System 1922-1947, 31 F.R.D. 307 (1963).
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tion of business in the courts of the United States, to prepare plans for
the assignment and transfer of judges to circuits or districts where they
were needed, and to submit such suggestions to the various courts
as seemed in the interest of uniformity and expedition of business. 138
Today, -the Judicial Conference consists of -the chief justice, -the
chief judge of each circuit, the chief judge of the Court of Claims, th.
chief judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and a district
judge from each judicial circuit. In addition to its original purposes
the conference is now required to carry on a continuous study of the
operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure now
or hereafter in use as prescribed by the Supreme Court for the other
courts of the United States. Such additions and changes to these
rules which the conference deems desirable are to be recommended to
the Supreme Court for adoption pursuant to the enabling acts. The
chief justice is required -to submit to Congress an -annual report of
the conference proceedings, including any recommendations for legis-
lation.
13 9
Despite the fact that the Judicial Conference is part of the judi-
cial branch of government it is not barred from giving advisory opin-
ions to Congress for three reasons. First, the conference is not a
strictly judicial organ. Although the named members of the Judicial
Conference are all members of the judiciary the overall scheme of the
conference is to encourage participation by the bar. In the circuit
conferences, for example, members of the bar participate in the an-
nual meetings as permitted by statute.140  In fact, in the Sixth Cir-
cuit Conference of 1963 there were more lawyer members than
judges.' 4 ' Additionally, the Judicial Conference relies on committees
to achieve its purposes. The advisory committees which drafted the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its subsequent amendments all
had lawyer members.'4 2  The Advisory Committee for the rules of
evidence consisted of three judges, 43 three lawyer-scholars, eight
lawyer-litigators, and the reporter.
44
Secondly, the conference is not sitting as a court of law. One of
the practical considerations for the ban on advisory opinions would
appear to be that the issuing court may eventually be required to ad-
judicate the issue upon which it has previously rendered advice. Since
138. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 838-39.
139. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970).
140. Id. § 333.
141. Boyd, The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Our Judicial Conference, 31 TENN.
L. REv. 329, 331-32 (1964).
142. Chandler, Some Major Advances in the Federal Judicial System 1922-1947,
31 F.R.D. 307, 491-92 (1963).
143. Judge Albert B. Maris was an ex officio member. Hearings, supra note 3, at
144. Id. at 79-84.
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the -conference does not exist as an adjudicating body there is no dan-
ger 'that its recommendations will come before it in a trial situation.
Additionally, the Judicial Conference already possesses the author-
ity to recommend legislation to Congress. Although privilege rules are
sv.;bstantive and beyond the rulemaking power, the enactment of such
.- des will nonetheless have a dramatic impact upon procedure in the
federal courts. The courts should be permitted to express their views
concerning the procedural effects of such rules. Congress has pro-
vi ded the Judicial Conference with an outlet for its advice concerning
sutch legislation since -the chief justice must include it within his an-
nu'al report to Congress.145 By utilizing this existing machinery, or
by authorizing closer contact between the Judicial Conference and
Congress, the legislature would be assured of the judicial expertise
which it desires and would remove the constitutional objeotions in-
herent in direct Supreme Court recommendations concerning substantive
matters.
Finally, we must remember that the advisory opinion problem is
really one of degree. Although the boundaries between the three
branches of government have become more indistinct and relaxed
over the years there are still some things which the highest tribunal
in the land should not and cannot do. No matter how practically
appealing the concept might appear, the Supreme Court cannot ad-
vise Congress concerning substantive legislation. The Judicial Con-
ference, on the other hand, would not be barred from giving such ad-
vice and, in fact, such judicial-legislative cooperation would ensure the
efficient functioning of the government.
Hopefully, therefore, the Supreme Court and Congress will
achieve an understanding whereby the judiciary will promulgate pro-
cedural rules of evidence and the legislature, with the advice of the
Judicial Conference, will make federal privilege rules when the in-
terest of judicial uniformity requires them. Such an arrangement
would provide both the flexibility of court-made rules and the con-
gressional approval which privilege rules demand.
Stephen C. Garavito*
145. See note 139 & accompanying text supra.
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